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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000203

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [KNNP](#) [PL](#) [IR](#) [AORC](#)

SUBJECT: POLES NOTE DETERIORATION OF ATMOSPHERE IN TEHRAN,
SUPPORT REFERRAL OF IRAN TO UNSC

REF: A. WARSAW 176

1B. STATE 19516

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., K. M. Hillas, for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

11. (C) Summary: Polish Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Witold Waszczykowski, told us that his attitude toward Iran had "completely changed" during his January 30-31 visit to Iran. He now believes Tehran is determined to acquire nuclear weapons. In a separate read-out MFA Director for Security Policy Robert Kupiecki described lengthy harangues from Iranian officials about what they see as a western conspiracy to deny Iran nuclear know-how, and Iranian "patience" with IAEA missions. The Poles observed a clear deterioration in the atmosphere in Tehran since their last visit, with rhetoric regressing to the language and style of twenty years ago. Officials threatened Poland on issues ranging from its UN votes on human rights to its presence in Iraq, and defended President Ahmadenijad's statements about Israel and the Holocaust. The Poles were thus not surprised by Iran's February 4 announcement that it would end cooperation with the IAEA and support the referral of Iran to the UNSC, as well as statements by the U.S. that diplomacy has not ended (Ref C). End Summary.

12. (C) Waszczykowski told Charge and PolCouns February 6 that his views on Iran had "completely changed" during his visit to Tehran at the end of January. His outlook was in sharp contrast to his gentle scolding of A/S Dan Fried during the January 25 Strategic Dialogue for what he called the "harsh" U.S. policy on Iran (Reftel A). Waszczykowski admitted (and Kupiecki separately emphasized) that his views were shaped during his years as Ambassador to Tehran under President Katami, when it seemed there might be some chance of opening. It took this trip to convince him that things had radically changed. During his visit he met with Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mutaki, Deputy Minister for European and American Affairs S. Jalili, and Chief Negotiator on Iranian nuclear program/Secretary of the Iranian Supreme Council Ali Larijani. Waszczykowski came away convinced that Tehran is determined to acquire nuclear weapons and that no carrots can succeed in deterring them. He noted the Iranians' "pockets are full of oil dollars" and that deals with China and other Asian countries, plus support from Russia, enabled them to ignore pressure from the West.

13. (C) Kupiecki described the meetings in greater detail to PolCouns, giving more flavor of the regime's rhetoric. He noted that each meeting lasted several hours, and each interlocutor opened with "ritual reassurances" of Iran's desire for good relations with Poland, before moving on to harangues and threats of harm to the bilateral relations on several issues. Foreign Minister Mutaki first raised the issue of Ali Ashgar Manzarpour, a British-Iranian citizen now in Polish custody awaiting extradition to the U.S. for violation of the ban on exports to Iran. Mutaki demanded Manzarpour be released and warned of a deterioration in bilateral relations should he be extradited to the U.S. Then Mutaki criticized Poland for voting in favor of a UN third Committee resolution regarding Iran's human rights record. He warned Iran would "open a file" on Poland's alleged hosting of a CIA "secret prison."

14. (C) Mutaki defended President Ahmadenijad's statements on Israel and the Holocaust. Mutaki claimed Ahmadenijad's call for Israel to be "wiped off the map" did not refer to military action, but rather to the "logic of the democratic process." He was simply calling for elections in "greater Palestine" (meaning Israel, the West Bank and Gaza) which would lead to the majority in the area "voting Israel out of existence." Mutaki also questioned whether the Holocaust was a "historical fact," and said he planned to organize an international conference in Iran to examine the question. Kupiecki said Waszczykowski replied firmly that Poland would not agree to question historical facts such as the Holocaust and or to question the "logic" of the Middle East peace process, but his words were met with lengthy and sterile statements. The Poles then had a separate, even longer meeting with Jalili who essentially delivered a harangue on the Holocaust, Israel, human rights, and "conspiracies" against Iran.

15. (C) Kupiecki described an equally long, difficult meeting

with nuclear negotiator Larijani, which sealed Waszczykowski's new-found alarm over Iran's intentions. Kupiecki described Larijani as more "complex" and sophisticated than his colleagues, but only marginally, emphasizing that he delivered a similarly "fanatical" message. Like his colleagues, Larijani started with an assurance of Iran's desire for good relations with Poland, but then launched into a defense of Iran's nuclear activities, arguing that the allegation that Iran wants nuclear weapons is a campaign inspired by the CIA and by U.S.-controlled media. He criticized Poland's engagement in Iraq and complained that the U.S. wanted to divide Iraq into three countries.

16. (C) Larijani harshly condemned the EU3 for trying to deny Iran the nuclear know-how it has the right to under the NPT. He claimed Iran wanted negotiations with the IAEA, but that the IAEA verification missions were in reality "hidden espionage missions" by western countries. Iran had cooperated voluntarily with 20 verification missions, which had shown Iran was not producing nuclear weapons, but its patience was at an end. Larijani kept repeating that Iran wanted to continue its relationship with the IAEA, but made clear this could only be done on Iran's terms. He also repeated several times that Iran intended to remain in the NPT and IAEA, even while claiming that nothing had been done under the NPT to disarm the nuclear powers. He said Iran wants to build peaceful nuclear power, and has nothing to hide. He dragged up historical complaints, including support of the west for the Shah, the war with Iraq (which he said the west had goaded Saddam into starting), and the complaint that Iran had paid for nuclear power plants from France which were never delivered. In short, Kupiecki said, Larijani veered wildly back and forth between accusing the west of conspiracy and claiming it wanted to continue negotiations.

17. (C) Kupiecki said that EU Ambassadors in Iran all shared the view that the situation had significantly deteriorated in Tehran. They all fully expected what in fact transpired later in the week, i.e., that Iran would announce it would no longer cooperate with the IAEA and proceed with uranium enrichment. As noted above, Waszczykowski is convinced Iran is determined to pursue nuclear weapons. Poland supports the reporting of Iran to the UNSC (Ref B), while welcoming U.S. statements that diplomacy has not ended.

18. (C) Comment: Kupiecki was emphatic in describing the worrisome atmosphere in Tehran. He said he had not shared Waszczykowski's previously optimistic views, but felt similarly there was a new "level of fanaticism" that contrasted sharply with the more open mood he had observed during his last visit to Tehran under President Katami. This most recent diplomatic visit, however, should help strengthen Polish support for U.S. initiatives in dealing with Iraq.

HILLAS